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(moral hazard). We characterize the optimal contracts offered by the regulator to the credit 
cooperatives. We have been able to show that the optimal contracts depend on 3 main factors 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Microfinance is the provision of a broad range of financial services such as deposits, 
loans, payment services, money transfers, and insurance to poor and low-income households 
and, their microenterprises. Microfinance institutions now reach well over 100 million clients 
and achieve impressive repayment rates on loan (Cull, Demirgüç-kunt, and Morduch 
(2009a)).  
Microfinance services are provided by three types of sources: formal institutions, such as rural 
banks and cooperatives; semiformal institutions, such as nongovernment organizations; and 
informal sources such as money lenders and shopkeepers. Microfinance institutions are 
defined as institutions whose major business is the provision of microfinance services. 
(Institutional microfinance is defined to include microfinance services provided by both 
formal and semiformal institutions). 
   
The interest in microfinance has burgeoned during the last three decades: multilateral 
lending agencies, bilateral donor agencies, developing and developed country governments, 
and nongovernment organizations all support the development of microfinance. A variety of 
private banking institutions has also joined this group in recent years. As a result, 
microfinance services have grown rapidly during the last decade, although from an initial low 
level, and have come to the forefront of development discussions concerning poverty 
reduction. 
The rapid growth of microfinance has brought increasing calls for regulation, but 
complying with prudential regulations and the associated supervision can be especially costly 
for microfinance institutions (Cull, Demirgüç-kunt, and Morduch (2009b)). Christen, Lyman, 
and Rosenberg (2003) speculate that compliance with prudential regulations could cost a 
microfinance institution five percent of assets in the first year and 1 percent or more 
thereafter.  
In discussing tradeoffs in regulation of microfinance, Christen, Lyman, and Rosenberg 
(2003) draw an important distinction between prudential and non-prudential regulation. 
According to their definition, regulation is prudential when “it is aimed specifically at 
protecting the financial system as a whole as well as protecting the safety of small deposits in 
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individual institutions”. The assets of microfinance institutions remain substantially less than 
those of formal providers of financial services, most notably banks, and thus they do not yet 
pose a risk to the stability of the overall financial system in most countries. However, an 
increasing share of microfinance institutions take deposits from the public, and many of the 
depositors are relatively poor. Protecting the safety of those deposits provides a rationale for 
improved regulation and supervision of microfinance institutions. 
We investigate the role of prudential regulation on the profitability and self-
sustainability of credit cooperatives. Credit cooperatives as formal financial institutions 
originated in nineteenth century Germany. These associations operate democratically; each 
member has one vote. Leadership is voluntary and unpaid, although professionals may be 
hired for day-to-day operations. Members contribute equity in the form of an initiation fee and 
regular capital contributions. The amount a member can borrow is based on his or her capital 
contributions. Profits are distributed to members in the form of dividends based on their 
equity contribution or retained to increase the organization’s capital. This ensures that benefits 
go to members rather than to external intermediaries and their shareholders. 
Cuevas and Fischer (2006) observe that “lack of knowledge of cooperative financial 
institutions governance, regulation and supervision has been a recurrent obstacle in 
development finance, resulting in widespread neglect of the cooperative financial institutions 
sector in spite of its pervasiveness and potential”. In addition, there are topics related to 
organization, governance, legislation, regulation and supervision of cooperative financial 
institutions over which there is no agreement but over which one is needed if we are to 
facilitate the growth of these institutions and realize their potential for serving the poor. The 
issues refer to fundamental questions such as: what are the main strengths and weaknesses of 
cooperative financial institutions, what is the role of the legal framework in doing this, should 
the legal framework be a specialized one covering uniformly all cooperative financial 
institutions or should the system be tiered, should cooperative financial institutions fall under 
banking authority supervision - most agree that yes, it should - but then how: direct, delegated 
or auxiliary supervision, see Cuevas and Fischer (2006). What are differences between these 
schemas, and the effects they have on performance of cooperative financial institutions? 
Delegated monitoring is probably the hottest point of the debate and disagreements on 
regulation and supervision of cooperative financial Institutions (CFIs). The argument that 
regulation and supervision in microfinance are less important because of its small economic 
role misjudges the exceptional sensibility of this segment and its possible contribution to 
financial systems development. Banks and other financial intermediaries are major players in 
modern economies by exerting a strong influence on risk sharing, capital allocation and 
economic growth. This important role in the economy stresses the need to safeguard the 
stability and soundness of the financial system. Recent financial crises in many countries have 
triggered renewed interest in the structure and conduct of banking regulation. The existence, 
type and scope of banking and prudential supervision have become topical issues and main 
subjects of intense academic and policy debates.  
The regulation and supervision of Microfinace Institutions (MFIs) should be subsumed 
in the overriding goal of developing a market-based financial system (Staschen (1999)). 
Target group demand is not limited to borrowing; it also includes other financial services such 
as savings, insurance, transfer facilities, etc. Savings facilities are a particulary important 
question when considering a prudential regulation of MFIs. The prospective target group is 
many times larger in deposit business than in lending (Staschen (1999)). Where the poor have 
no access to savings facilities MFIs should also take up deposit business. Another reason for 
regulating this sector is that MFIs’available funds cannot keep pace with their lending 
business. To reach as many prospective borrowers as possible MFIs also need to have access 
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to external finance in addition to their own resources and finance from donors. The question 
of whether banking regulation is in fact appropriate.  
There are three typical regulatory approaches for Microfinance institutions sector (see e.g. 
Staschen (1999), and Berenbach and Churchill (1997) for a similar classification): the 
regulation of MFIs by existing banking legislation, regulation by a special MFI law and self-
regulation. Statutory regulation and self-regulation differ as to who lays down the rules and 
how they are stipulated. In government regulation this is the task of the legislator or 
subordinate administrative agencies. The distinction in statutory regulation between 
regulation by banking law and by a special MFI law is not a methodological necessity, but it 
is very helpful to give existing regulatory approaches a structure. In self-regulation the 
institution to be regulated set their standards themselves, not each on its own (this would be 
internal self-regulation), but as a group (e.g. through an association), and these are equally 
binding for all. Self-regulation and statutory regulation are the two extremes demarcating a 
continuum of regulatory methods. Pure self-regulation (i.e. without any government 
influence), is rare. More frequent is indirect influence through government bodies (e.g. via 
state licensing of regulatory institutions. This approach is also termed: indirect supervision or 
delegated monitoring.  
Indirect supervision is a regulatory regime that is unique to cooperative financial 
institutions (CFIs). In this regime an agent (the delegated or auxiliary supervisor) performs 
certain tasks associated the supervisory function on behalf of the state authority (the principal 
supervisor). The agent may be (and usually is) a body specially setup by the network of CFI, 
but could potentially be any other independent party like an auditing firm or a rating agency. 
The ultimate responsibility of the functioning of the regime rests squarely with the principal 
supervisor, and no indirect supervision regime should be expected to work without a 
commitment of the later to make it work. This is government regulation with delegation of 
supervisory tasks to a private institution CGAP (2003). Historically this regime grows from 
the experiences in Germany (and then Europe), starting in the second half of the XIX century, 
throughout modern times, where it is still the dominant supervision regime. 
There is no theoretical or empirical work from which we can draw clear guidelines. 
The little theoretical work that touches tangentially on the subject provides only arguments 
why these kinds of arrangements might work. On the empirical side, although there is vast 
experience out there of the successes and failures of systems that work with and without 
delegated/ auxiliary monitoring, this information has not been processed in an orderly fashion 
allowing drawing inference. We are reduced to the fact that there are systems of CFIs that 
employ the approach and work well. The same can be said of systems operating under direct 
supervision. Auxiliary/delegated monitoring is also employed in other networks such as those 
of savings and loans banks (German, Scandinavian countries, and Spain for many years 
before switching to a direct supervision schema), insurance (Quebec) and health insurance 
(France, Belgium). 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) can be classified into three rough categories 
depending on the structure of the liabilities side of their balance sheets. This classification is 
given by Van Greuning, Gallardo and Randhawa (1999). First category comprises all MFIs 
which depend on other people’s money to finance their lending business. These MFIs are 
described as credit-only institutions as well. They include financial NGOs. In the second 
category member’s deposits is used to grant loans exclusively to members. Classic examples 
of this are saving and credit cooperative and/or credit unions. The latter category comprises 
all MFIs that use the public’s money to finance their lending business. These do not include 
financial institutions that employ forced savings components to secure their lending 
transactions, however, as long as their clients are net borrowers. 
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Another type are formal banks with a microfinance window. The regulations of 
banking legislation automatically apply to their microfinance portfolio, but these are usually 
poorly adapted to the requirements in this area. This problem has not yet been solved. Each 
institutional type stands out for an idiosyncratic risk of its own, which has a bearing on the 
best regulatory framework to choose. 
Cooperative financial institutions, albeit highly pervasive in most countries, are among the 
poorly understood entities that comprise the existing institutional base for financial 
intermediation. CFIs include diverse member-owned financial intermediaries’ referred to as 
credit unions, savings and credit cooperatives, cooperative banks, and other terms that differ 
across regions of world. For example, Savings and Cooperatives in East Africa; “Caisses 
populaires or Caisses d’épargne et de crédit” in West and Central Africa; “Cooperativas de 
ahorro y crédito” or “Cajas de ahorro y crédito” in Latin A merica; credit unions in the UK, 
USA and parts of Canada (see, Cuevas and Fischer (2006)). 
Their institutional structure and governance, legal and regulatory status, and scale and 
services portfolio also vary widely across regions and especially between industrialized 
countries and developing economies. A most basic common denominator is that they collect 
deposits and do business often solely with members (see Cuevas and Fischer (2006)). CFIs 
serve many poor people, even though middle-income clients are also among their 
membership, a feature that in fact allows CFIs to reach poor segments of the population 
without necessarily compromising their sustainability. 
In deposit business there is an asymmetric distribution of information available to the 
depositors on the one hand and the financial institutions on the other. The focus of this is on 
the debate associated with indirect supervision, i.e., delegated and auxiliary supervision 
mechanisms. We examine the role of prudential supervision and information disclosure as a 
regulatory instrument, and analysis its effects on performance of CFIs concerning incentives 
and effort. Here, information disclosure refers to the optimal monitoring scheme by the 
supervising agency taking into account all costs and benefits of such a scheme. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews briefly both the empirical and 
theoretical literature on regulation and supervision. In Section 3, we set out the structure of 
our model. We also discuss the first-best contract in which overall quality and effort can be 
observed and verified by the regulator. Supervision and disclosure play no role in this setting. 
In Section 4, we derive the properties of the optimal incentive contract with informational 
asymmetry. Some conclusions are drawn in Section 5. 
 
 
2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
  
 Previous research on microfinance regulation and prudential supervision focuses on 
the relationship between financial performance and regulation, treating outreach as a 
secondary concern (see Cull, Demirgüç-kunt, and Morduch (2009b)). Ndambu (2011) and 
many others have analyzed the impact of regulation on financial intermediaries (including 
MFIs) worldwide, deriving potential implications of microfinance supervision in a consistent 
manner and moving one step beyond countries’ anecdotal evidence. Hartarska (2005) finds 
that regulated microfinance institutions in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly 
Independent States have lower return on assets relative to others, and weak evidence that the 
breadth of outreach may be related to regulation. After controlling for the endogeneity of 
regulation, Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) have conducted a research using a positive 
approach to assess if regulated MFIs achieve better sustainability and outreach than 
unregulated MFIs. They find that regulation has no impact on financial performance and weak 
evidence that regulated microfinance institutions serve less poor borrowers. As a policy 
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implication, they concluded that MFIs’ transformation into regulated financial intermediaries 
might not lead to improved financial results and outreach. However, they fund institutions 
collecting savings reaching more borrowers, thus suggesting that regulation might have an 
indirect benefit if it is the only way allowing MFIs to collect deposits from the public. 
Cull, Demirgüc-kunt, and Morduch (2009b) examine the implications for the 
institutions’ profitability and their outreach to small scale borrowers and women. The tests 
draw on a new database that combines high-quality financial data on 245 of the world’s 
largest microfinance institutions with newly-constructed data on their prudential supervision. 
Ordinary least squares regressions show that supervision is negatively associated with 
profitability. Controlling for the non-random assignment of supervision via treatment effects 
and instrumental variables regressions, the analysis finds that supervision is associated with 
substantially larger average loan sizes and less lending to women than in ordinary least 
squares regressions, although it is not significantly associated with profitability. The pattern is 
consistent with the notion that profit-oriented microfinance institutions absorb the cost of 
supervision by curtailing outreach to market segments that tend to be more costly. By 
contrast, microfinance institutions that rely on non-commercial sources of funding, are thus 
are less profit-oriented, do not adjust loan sizes or lend less to women when supervised, but 
their profitability is significantly reduced. 
Ndambu (2011) discusses the potential impact of regulatory on microfinance in Sub-
Saharan Africa using cross section data from the mix market of 192 microfinance institutions 
from 32 different countries. The results do not show sufficient evidence that the regulatory 
status increases the sustainability of MFIs nor does the deposit intermediation. However, after 
controlling for the regulatory capacity, there is clear evidence that countries with a high 
Official Supervision Power have more sustainable MFIs and it is only after integrating the 
Official Supervision Power in the model that the deposit intermediation coefficient becomes 
significant and positively associated with the Operational Self sufficiency. 
 Though these results are intuitive from an economic perspective, it remains an open 
question whether the benefits of supervision in terms of better protection of depositors’ funds 
and improved stability in the MFI sector outweigh the reductions in outreach. 
 This study considers the optimal regulation of a single bank that has private 
information on the intrinsic quality of its loan portfolio. The credit cooperative is able to raise 
its total quality above its intrinsic quality by exerting costly managerial effort. Higher overall 
quality enhances the distribution of returns on the bank’s loan portfolio and therefore its 
expected profits. However, the choice of effort is unobservable to the regulator and cannot be 
verified. So, in this setting the regulator faces adverse selection and moral hazard which has 
important consequences for designing the optimal contract. A similar approach is taken in for 
example Giammarino, Lewis, and Sappington (1993) and Rochet (1992). Our study extends 
Giammarino, Lewis and Sappington’s focus on incentive compatibility requirements by 
analyzing the regulator’s concern for social welfare. The regulator offers the bank a menu of 
contracts from which the cooperative chooses depending on its characteristics and on the 
profit sharing scheme between the regulator and the cooperative. In this way contracts are not 
rigidly imposed on all banks, but induce self-selection by cooperatives through incentive 
compatibility. 
Information asymmetry due to the bank’s private information about its costs of 
operation (selection adverse) and about hidden actions that managers of bank (moral hazard) 
induce a loss of control for the regulator and limit the effectiveness of its regulatory policy. 
This loss of control may be mitigated by collecting bank specific information, creating the 
need for active prudential supervision. Supervising agency acting on behalf of the regulator 
may be able to resolve the information asymmetry between the regulator and the bank, 
depending on its competence and ability to gather information. We assume that the supervisor 
 7 
retrieves a signal imperfectly correlated with the bank’s intrinsic quality and that it is able to 
improve this signal at certain costs. These costs reflect on the one hand the direct costs of 
devoting more resources to the supervisory task, but on the other hand also the costs attached 
to increased public concern about the soundness of the inspected bank, when the disclosed 
information turns out to be bad. In the event that the bank’s management is caught shirking, 
the regulator may react by imposing a punishment to correct this undesired behaviour. The 
regulator must optimally weigh the costs and benefits of an active prudential supervision 
policy, which defines an optimal monitoring scheme. 
The purpose of this paper is to characterize the optimal contracts offered by the 
regulator to the credit cooperatives. It is shown that these contracts depend on the accuracy of 
the supervisor’s signal, the likelihood of facing a high quality financial intermediary, and the 
cost of supervision.  
 
 
3. THE MODEL 
 
Our analysis sets out from the viewpoint that members of the cooperative credit 
society need to be protected and represented by a regulator. To protect the interest of 
members, cooperative societies are placed under state control through registration. While 
getting registered, a society has to submit details about the members and the business it is to 
undertake. It has to maintain books of accounts, which are to be audited by government 
auditors. We consider a regulator-cooperative society two-player hierarchy as a stylized 
model of a regulated microfinance sector, where the state authority (the principal supervisor) 
may require the help of a supervising agent (the delegated or auxiliary supervisor) to collect 
information. The model heavily builds on Giammarino, Lewis, and Sappington (1993), 
Laffont and Tirole [1993], and Dewatripont and Tirole, (1994). In Giammarino, Lewis, and 
Sappington (1993), the bank retains its own profits, and the regulator is modelled as 
presenting a menu of options to the bank, these options linked to the required capital structure 
depending on the bank’s type. Our designed incentive contracts are so to say the “monetary 
equivalent” of these options.  
The specific details of our model are as follows. There are four classes of risk-neutral 
players: (1) members/depositors that seek loans to finance projects, (2) cooperative credit 
society that provide intermediation services, (3) a auxiliary supervisor performs certain tasks 
associated to the supervisory function on behalf of the state authority, and (4) a regulator (the 
principal supervisor) who is required to insure deposits issued by the cooperative credit 
society. 
The regulation environment is such that the principal supervisor is the residual 
claimant of the imposed (vertical) hierarchical structure. Every cooperative society in addition 
to providing services to its member also generates some profit while conducting business. 
Profits are not earned at the cost of its members. Profit generates is distributed to its members 
not on the basis of the shares held by the members (like the company form of business), but 
on the basis of members participation in the business of society. In our model, regulation and 
supervision of cooperative financial institutions refers to the extent of profit sharing between 
the regulator, members and cooperative society. In particular, it is assumed that the regulator 
captures all the profits of the cooperative and compensates the cooperative’s management for 
its exerted effort by offering a contract which specifies a monetary transfer from the regulator 
to the cooperative society. 
The cooperative credit society employs the deposits they receive to finance projects 
promising a random return, depending on the overall quality of the cooperative’s loan 
portfolio. The cooperative society is able to enhance this overall quality of its loan portfolio 
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by exerting costly effort. The regulator does not know the cooperative society’s exact type in 
terms of the exogenously given intrinsic quality nor observes its exerted effort. We now turn 
to each player in more detail. 
 
3.1. The players 
 
3.1.1. Members/Depositors 
 
We assume that each member has access to an investment project. The member is 
unable to finance the project alone and thus requires an outside source of funding. For 
simplicity, we assume that cooperative credit society is the only source of funds. Although 
each investment project requires the same amount of funding from the cooperative credit 
society, projects differ in their expected returns. We denote by R  the average rate of return on 
all projects financed by the cooperative credit society. If the cooperative society lends a total 
of L
 
to members who collectively generate an average return of R , the cooperative credit 
society earns an overall return of RL . 
 
3.1.2. The Cooperative Credit Society 
 
 The cooperative credit societies are formed to provide financial support to the 
members. The society accepts deposits from members and grants them loans at reasonable 
rates of interest in times of need. Village Service Cooperative Society and Urban Cooperative 
Bank are examples of cooperative credit society. At the beginning of the period 0=t
 
initial 
deposits D
 
are used to finance loans L , normalizing DL = . In a cooperative society capital is 
contributed by all the members. However, it can easily raise loans and secure grants from 
government after its registration.  
The Cooperative Society owns no equity. Cooperative is not formed to maximize 
profit like other forms of business organization. The main purpose of a cooperative society is 
to provide service to its members. The cooperative credit society offers a standard debt 
contract to its members at a reasonable price by retaining a small margin of profit. The 
Cooperative credit society offers an interest rate r
 
to depositors at maturity at 1=t . Deposits 
are not insured and pay zero before maturity. The investment provides an average gross return 
of . The net return on the loans is influenced by the operating economies achieved by the 
cooperative credit society. We denote by , an increasing, strictly convex function, the cost 
of processing  of risky loans. Hence the net return on risky loans is . The average 
gross rate of return  on the loans is random, but its distribution depends on the overall 
quality  of the loan portfolio. More precisely, higher levels of shift the distribution of 
returns in the sense of either first-order stochastic dominance (i.e., reduce the likelihood of 
low returns) or second-order stochastic dominance (i.e., reduce the variance of returns). 
 Formally, it is assumed that is modeled as a random variable with smooth 
distribution function )/( qRG . Technically, we assume the underlying density function has 
positive support on [ ]RR,  and: 
The overall quality of cooperative credit society’s loan portfolio consists of an 
exogenous and endogenous part. For simplicity, we assume: eqq += 0 , where 0q denotes 
intrinsic quality (exogenous) and e denotes (endogenous) effort exerted by the cooperative’s 
management.  
We assume the cooperative credit society knows the exact level of intrinsic quality, 
while the regulator views intrinsic quality as a random variable on the interval [ ]qq,  with 
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density function )( 0qf . And let )( 0qF
 
be the corresponding distribution function, 
with 0)(
)(1
0
0
0
≤




 −
qf
qF
dq
d
, ],[0 qqq ∈∀ . 
The cooperative credit society is able to raise its overall quality above its intrinsic 
quality by exerting managerial effort e
 
which is costly. We assume that the cooperative 
management’s disutility is given by )(eψ . 
The reduction in disutility by lowering effort may represent either the manager’s 
valuation for a low-pressure job of selecting loans or the private benefit received by 
distributing loans among friends rather than to the best borrowers. A central feature of our 
model is the cooperative credit society’s private information about its influence on the return 
it receives from the risky projects it finances. The information asymmetry in this model 
concerns that neither the exact type of the cooperative 0q  nor the exerted effort e  is 
observable to the regulator, but only known to the cooperative. 
The expected gross profits on its loan portfolio of a cooperative society are given by: 
 
dRqRgqLqLCqRLq
R
R
∫ −−= )/()]())(()([)( 0000pi       (1) 
 
Note that negative gross profits induce default (bankruptcy) since it is assumed that 
the cooperative society has no own equity. The probability of cooperative society failure as a 
function of effort is given by dRqqRgep
R
R
∫= )(/()( 0 . Finally, realized profits at 1=t  directly 
accrue to the regulator. In return the cooperative is compensated for its effort by means of a 
monetary transferT . The cooperative society’s expected utility CU  amounts to: 
 
PeTU C −−= )(ψ           (2) 
 
this can be written by 
 
)()()()( 0000 qPqqqTqU C −−−= ψ         (3) 
 
Where P denotes the possible punishment imposed on the cooperative society’s 
management by the regulator, whenever suspected of shirking. However, the penalty imposed 
cannot exceed the net transfer, reflecting the limited liability of the cooperative society’s 
management. We impose )()( 00 qTqP ≤ . 
 
3.1.3. The Delegated monitoring and auxiliary supervision 
 
 Generally it is seen that cooperative society does not function efficiently due to lack 
of managerial talent. The members or their elected representatives are not experienced enough 
to manage the cooperative society. In our regulatory game the supervisor has the ability to 
detect false reports of the cooperative society management. In this sense it may prevent the 
cooperative from shirking since the cooperative faces a penalty if caught lying. Consequently, 
the costs of regulation may drop and better incentives for low quality cooperative societies 
may result. Obviously much depend on the supervisor’s accuracy to detect shirking behavior. 
Moreover, it is assumed that the regulator is unable to perform the supervisory task itself. 
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Indirect supervision is a regulatory regime that is unique to cooperative financial institutions. 
In this regime an agent (the delegated or auxiliary supervisor) performs certain tasks 
associated to the supervisory function on behalf of the state authority (the principal 
supervisor). 
This could well be the case because supervision comprise of complex monitoring and 
auditing activities which require specific skills. Like the regulator the supervisor is 
uninformed about the cooperative society’s true type 0q , but receives a signal θ  which is 
imperfectly correlated with the cooperative society’s exerted effort. 
The supervisor reports a signal  to the regulator. With probability  the 
supervisor finds out the true 0q
 
and with probability µ−1
 
it finds no new information. This 
probability µ
 
reflects the signal’s precision or accuracy. The supervisor may improve its 
accuracy, but only by incurring costs. It is assumed that these costs are increasing and convex 
in µ , 
2
)(
2µµγ = .           (4) 
 
3.1.4. The Cooperative Regulator 
 
 The inadequacy of capital and various other limitations make cooperative societies 
dependant on the government for support and patronage in terms of grants, loans subsidies, 
etc. Due to this, the government sometimes directly interferes in the management of the 
society and also audits their annual accounts. The regulator’s task is to provide deposit 
insurance while maximizing social welfare. It captures all profits from the cooperative society 
and designs the contract which it offers to the cooperative’s management to compensate for 
the exerted effort. The contract specifies a monetary transfer T  from the regulator to the 
cooperative, to which the regulator is irrevocably committed to pay just after the returns on 
the loans materialize at 1=t . The critical information asymmetry in our model centers on the 
costs of enhancing the quality of the cooperative credit society’s loan portfolio. The 
functional form of )(eψ  and the relationship between quality and the cooperative society’s’ 
efforts ( eqq += 0 ) are common knowledge. The regulator cannot observe the realization of 
0q
 
nor can the regulator monitor the level of discretionary resources that the manager devotes 
to quality enhancement. The informational asymmetry implies that no written contract can be 
contingent on effort directly, but instead must be geared to observable realized total quality of 
the loan portfolio q . 
Without loss of generality, we model the regulator as presenting a menu of linked 
options { }(.)(.),(.),(.), PLTq  to the cooperative credit society. The cooperative society is 
permitted to choose one of these options after observing the environment in which it is 
operating. Nature chooses the cooperative’s type 0q . The cooperative society learns its type. 
We will denote by { })(),(),(),( 0000 qPqLqTqq the particular contract that the cooperative will 
select in equilibrium when 0q is the realized level of its intrinsic quality. After announcing the 
contract it has selected, the cooperative society raises the required amount of issues deposits. 
The funds raised are used to make loans. The cooperative society chooses effort e
 
which 
determines total quality of the loan portfolio. The supervisor monitors this procedure and 
prevents the cooperative from operating if the specified quality level is not achieved. If the 
quality level is achieved, the cooperative remains in operation until 1=t . The cost of 
government involvement in the regulation and supervision of cooperative financial 
institutions is captured by the assumption that the social cost of public funds used to finance 
the insurance program is 1)1( >+ λ . 
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Social welfare in our model reflects cooperative credit society profits less the social 
costs generated by financial distress and social cost of government intervention in the 
regulation and supervision of cooperative financial institutions. The costs of financial distress 
are given by the expected negative payoffs during bankruptcy plus the social costs of financial 
distress which are assumed to be proportional to these losses. 
dRqqRgqLqLCqRLbqC
R
R
d ))(/()]())(()([)1()( 00000 −−+= ∫     (5) 
 
The regulator maximizes expected social welfareW , where 
 
))]()()()()(1()([ 0000 qPqTqCqEW d −+++−= µγλpi      (6) 
 
The problem of designing optimal regulation of a single cooperative credit society that 
has private information on the intrinsic quality of its loan portfolio can be written as: 
 
000000
,,,
)())]()()()()(1()([ dqqfqPqTqCqMax d
q
q
PLTq
−+++−∫ µγλpi     (7) 
subject to, ],[ˆ, 00 qqqq ∈∀ : 
   0),( 00 ≥qqUC        (8) 
   ),ˆ(),( 0000 qqUqqU CC ≥       (9) 
 
The inequalities (8) describe the individual rationality constraints of cooperative 
society ensure that, for all realizations of intrinsic quality, the cooperative society expects to 
have nonnegative utility.  
The incentive compatibility constraints (9) identify { })(),(),(),( 0000 qPqLqTqq as the 
contract the cooperative will select when its intrinsic quality level is 0q . 
 
3.2. The Full information benchmark 
 
In this case there are no informational asymmetries. The regulator is able to observe 
and verify the exact cooperative society’s type and its exerted effort. Supervision costs are 
normalized at zero. The regulator maximizes social welfare in presence of bankruptcy costs. 
This is the policy that the regulator would implement if he shared the cooperative society’s 
private knowledge of its intrinsic quality level (so that the incentive compatibility constraints 
were not relevant), and if 0=λ . Equation (7) can be written: 
 
)())(()(/()]())(()()[( 0000000 qUqqqdRqqRgqLqLCqRLbW C
R
R
−−−−−−= ∫ ψ   (10) 
 
The maximizing problem leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. Suppose first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) or second-order stochastic 
dominance (SOSD) hold. Then the optimal contract under symmetric information is 
characterized by: 
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(i): [ ]qqq ,0 ∈∀ , ))(()( 000 qqqqT −=ψ ;       (11) 
 
(ii):  0))(()))(/(()]())(()()[( 000000 =−′−−−−∫ qqqdRqqRgdq
dqLqLCqRLb
R
R
ψ  (12) 
 
(iii): ∫ =−′−− ∗∗
R
R
dRqqRgqLCRb 0)(/(]1)(()[( 00 .      (13) 
 
Equation (11) states that at the first-best level of effort, marginal gains of effort and 
marginal costs of effort are equated. Higher effort induces higher expected utility and lowers 
the probability of bank failure, but increases the disutility of effort and therefore the required 
transfer for the cooperative society. The regulator pays the cooperative society just enough to 
make it accept the contract.  
Equation (12) identifies the first-best level of quality for the cooperative’s loan 
portfolio. Increases in quality increase the expected cash flows of the cooperative and reduce 
the probability of failure. At the first-best level of quality, these marginal gains are equal to 
the marginal costs of additional quality (.)ψ ′ .  
The optimal level of loan activity reflects the usual trade-off between the expected 
benefits from debt and the social costs of bankruptcy. 
 
 
4. OPTIMAL REGULATION UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
 
In this case, it is assumed that the regulator faces adverse selection and moral hazard. 
In designing the contract, the regulator cannot condition on effort directly, so transfers have to 
be made a function of total realized quality ( q ) of the cooperative’s loan portfolio. The 
regulator is concerned with limiting the cooperative society’s information rents because these 
rents are paid with the distortionary tax system. The regulator must now weigh the gains form 
inducing optimal effort against the costs of leaving a rent. Using the revelation principle, we 
may restrict ourselves to so-called direct revelation mechanisms which have to fulfil the 
incentive compatibility constraints. 
The Envelope Theorem to applied to the maximization of (7) with respect to 
0qˆ implies that 
 
 ))((
ˆ
ˆ
00
00
0
qqq
qq
qd
dU C
−
′=
=
ψ        (14) 
From (14), )( 0qU C is strictly creasing in 0q . So the individual rationality constraint is 
satisfied if 0)( ≥qU C . Integrating (14) yield: 
 
∫ ′+=
0
~)~),~(()()( 0
q
q
CC qdqqqqUqU ψ         (15) 
Using (15), the regulator’s objective function can then be written: 
 
 13 
)()1(
)())]())((~)~)~(()()(1()([ 000000
0
qU
dqqfqqqqdqqqqCqW
C
q
q
d
q
q
λ
µγψψλpi
+−
+−+−′++−= ∫∫
 (16) 
Because )(qU C may be set equal to zero without loss of generality, and 0)( =qF , after 
integrating by parts (16) can then be written: 
 
 
00
0
0
00
000000
0000
)()(
)(1))(()1(
)])(()()(/()]())(()([)1)[(1(
)(/()]())(()([
dqqf
qf
qF
qqq
qqqdRqqRgqLqLCqRLb
dRqqRgqLqLCqRLW
R
R
q
q
R
R


−
−
′+−
−++−−++−
−−




=
∫
∫ ∫
ψλ
ψµγλ  (17) 
The optimal incentive contract is the solution of the pointwise maximization of W with 
respect to q and L . The results to follow are similar of those Giammarino, Lewis, and 
Sappington (1993). 
  
4.1. The Optimal incentive contract without supervision  
 
The next proposition reports how the information asymmetry and the social cost of 
government financing combine to induce departures from the first-best solution. 
 
Proposition 2. Suppose first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) or second-order stochastic 
dominance (SOSD) hold. Then the optimal contract under asymmetric information without 
supervision is characterized by: 
 
(i): ∫ −′++−=
0
~)~)~(()())(()( 000
q
q
o qdqqqqPqqqqT ψψ ;    (18) 
 
(ii)
)(
)(1))(()1())(()1(
)))(/(()]())(()()][1)(1(1[
0
0
0000
0000
qf
qF
qqqqqq
dRqqRg
dq
dqLqLCqRLb
R
R
−
−
′′+=−′+−
−−++−∫
ψλψλ
λ
   (19) 
 
(iii): ∫ =−′−++− ∗∗
R
R
dRqqRgqLCRb 0)(/(]1)(()][1)(1(1[ 00λ .    (20) 
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Proposition 2 shows a familiar result in incentive theory (Laffont and Tirole (1986), 
(1993)). The informational rents of the cooperative cannot be completely eliminated when the 
cooperative has private knowledge of 0q (see equation (19)). Proposition 2 reports how the 
information asymmetry and the social cost of government financing combine to induce 
departures from the first-best solution. The departures are designed to limit any gains the 
credit cooperative might anticipate from understating its intrinsic quality level by choosing 
from the menu of contracts one that, in equilibrium, will be selected by the credit cooperative 
when a smaller value of 0q is realized.  
Equation (18) identifies the primary deviation from the first-best solution that the 
regulator implements is a reduction in the final level of quality that the credit cooperative will 
achieve for all but the credit cooperative with the highest realization of intrinsic quality. 
Quality distortions are common in incentive problems of this type. The reduced quality limits 
the gains to the credit cooperative from understating its intrinsic quality. 
 
4.2. The Optimal incentive contract with supervision  
 
Supervision can either be financed through contributions by the financial institutions 
under supervision or from the national budget. An advantage of the latter option is that the 
financial institutions cannot use their contributions to pressure the supervisory agency. 
Employing a supervising agency enables the government to reduce the costs of regulation 
which are caused by leaving the high quality cooperative credit society an informational rent. 
Reducing this informational rent consequently leads to a smaller distortion in the effort level 
of the low quality cooperative, which in turn reduces the probability of credit cooperative 
failure. The regulator obtains a truthful report from the supervisor who is able to retrieve a 
signal about the cooperative’s exerted effort.  
Because of the possibility that new valuable information is retrieved with 
probability µ , the incentive compatibility constraint must be modified. 
 
))ˆ())ˆ(()ˆ(())ˆ(()ˆ()(1())(()( 0000000000 qPqqqqTqqqqTqqqqT −−−+−−−≥−− ψµψµψ
            (21) 
Obviously, since the supervisor cannot collude with the credit cooperative, the optimal 
punishment is the maximal one, that is, )ˆ()ˆ( 00 qTqP = .  Moreover there is no use in 
supervising when observing a high overall quality. In equilibrium, high overall quality reflects 
high effort under incentive compatibility. We do not consider the possibility of sending the 
supervisor on a random basis when observing low overall quality; see Kofman and Lawarrée 
(1993) on this topic. 
Given µ , the maximizing problem becomes: 
 
000000
,,,
)())]()()()()(1()([max dqqfqPqTqCq d
q
q
PLTq
−+++−∫ µγλpi     (22) 
subject to: 
 
))(()( 000 qqqqT −≥ψ          (23) 
 
)))ˆ((())ˆ(()ˆ()(1())(()( 00000000 qqqqqqqTqqqqT −−−−−≥−− ψµψµψ   (24) 
 
The Lagrangian of this program reads: 
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)])ˆ(())ˆ(()ˆ()(1())(()([
))(()((
)())]()()()()(1()([),,,(
00000000
000
000000
qqqqqqqTqqqqT
qqqqT
dqqfqPqTqCqPTLqL d
q
q
−+−−−−−−+
−−+
−+++−= ∫
µψψµψκ
ψη
µγλpi
  (25) 
 
A solution of this problem is giving in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. Suppose first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) or second-order stochastic 
dominance (SOSD) hold with )ˆ()ˆ( 00 qPqT = . Then the optimal incentive contract with 
supervision is characterized by: 
 
(i): ))(()( 00 qqqqT o −=ψ ;         (26) 
 
(ii): ))ˆ((
1
1)ˆ()ˆ( 0000 qqqqTqP −
−
== ψ
µ
;       (27) 
 
(iii): 
0)])ˆ(()21())(([))((
)))(/(()]())(()()][1)(1(1[
000000
0000
=−′−−−′−+−′−
−−++−∫
qqqqqqqqq
dRqqRg
dq
dqLqLCqRLb
R
R
ψµψκψη
λ
   (28) 
 
(iv): ∫ =−′−++− ∗∗
R
R
dRqqRgqLCRb 0)(/(]1)(()][1)(1(1[ 00λ .    (29) 
 
From Proposition 3 it immediately follows that the effort level is increasing in the 
probability µ (see Equation 27). Hence, as the accuracy of supervision improves, the 
distortion of the effort becomes smaller. Obviously, we 
have ))ˆ(())(( 0000 qqqqqq −=− ψψ for 0=µ (no value of supervision). 
 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we introduced a framework for designing and analyzing the properties of 
the optimal regulation of a single credit cooperative that has private information on the 
intrinsic quality of its loan portfolio (adverse selection) and where the cooperative’s choice of 
effort to improve this quality cannot be observed by the regulator (moral hazard).  
In designing the contract the regulator faces a trade off between inducing proper 
incentives and the costs of regulation as a consequence of informational asymmetries. This 
may create a demand for information gathering. If observed overall quality is low the 
regulator may decide to use a supervising agency. The supervisor collects information and 
retrieves a signal about the cooperative’s intrinsic quality, however not with perfect certainty. 
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By incurring costs, the supervisor is able to punish the cooperative’s management if caught 
lying. In designing optimal contracts the regulator trades off incentives for efficient 
cooperative against costs of regulation. 
Our analysis here of the optimal contracts specifies monetary transfers from the 
regulator to the credit cooperative. These monetary transfers are not commonly observed in 
practice. In the first-best solution, the regulator is able to observe and verify the exact 
cooperative society’s type and its exerted effort. Supervision costs are normalized at zero. The 
regulator maximizes social welfare in presence of bankruptcy costs. Higher effort induces 
higher expected utility and lowers the probability of bank failure, but increases the disutility 
of effort and therefore the required transfer for the cooperative society. The regulator pays the 
cooperative society just enough to make it accept the contract. Increases in quality increase 
the expected cash flows of the cooperative and reduce the probability of failure. At the first-
best level of quality, these marginal gains are equal to the marginal costs of additional quality. 
The optimal level of loan activity reflects the usual trade-off between the expected benefits 
from debt and the social costs of bankruptcy 
The informational rents of the cooperative cannot be completely eliminated when the 
cooperative has private knowledge of intrinsic quality of portfolio. Proposition 2 reports how 
the information asymmetry and the social cost of government financing combine to induce 
departures from the first-best solution. The departures are designed to limit any gains the 
credit cooperative might anticipate from understating its intrinsic quality level by choosing 
from the menu of contracts one that, in equilibrium, will be selected by the credit cooperative 
when a smaller value of intrinsic quality is realized. Quality distortions are common in 
incentive problems of this type. The reduced quality limits the gains to the credit cooperative 
from understating its intrinsic quality. 
The probability of cooperative financial institutions failure is the same for all 
realization of intrinsic quality (Compare equation (13), (20) , and (29)). 
 Our study abstracts form several factors that could be included in future research. 
First, although the interaction between regulator and credit cooperatives is not repeated, 
qualitative conclusions will continue to hold in many settings with repeated play. Second, we 
characterize information disclosure by the optimal monitoring scheme. However, the decision 
whether or not to bring out the information found by the supervisor to the public is not really 
modelled. The optimal regulation policies in these situations merit further investigation. 
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